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BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS
Glenn G. Morris*
INADVERTENT PARTNERSHIPS
"Inadvertent partnerships" are business relationships that turn out
to be treated, legally, as partnerships even though one or more of the
parties to the relationship may have had no idea that he was becoming
anybody's partner. In Cajun Electric Power Cooperative, Inc. v.
McNamara,' the Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal announced a
new, seven-element test for the formation of a such partnerships under
Louisiana law. 2 This added one more test to the three already in existence3
Copyright 19"6, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
* Assistant Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 452 So. 2d 212 (La. App. 1st Cir.), cert. denied, 458 So. 2d 123 (La. 1984).
2. The seven "requisites" are:
(1) A contract between two or more persons;
(2) A juridical entity or person is established;
(3) Contribution by all parties of either efforts or resources;
(4) The contribution must be in determinate proportions;
(5) There must be joint effort;
(6) There must be a mutual risk vis-A-vis losses;
(7) There must be a sharing of profits.
452 So. 2d at 215.
3. The other three are: (a) the Uniform Partnership Act (U.P.A.) approach, utilized
in the common law states, of ascertaining "co-ownership" of a business, Penn v. Burk,
244 La. 267, 152 So. 2d 16 (1963) (citing earlier cases that had relied on the U.P.A.
theory and had quoted the Corpus Juris); compare Penn, 244 La. at 294-95, 152 So. 2d
at 26 with U.P.A. §§ 7, 16, as reprinted in Selected Corporation and Partnership Statutes,
Rules and Forms (West 1985) and Martin v. Peyton, 246 N.Y. 213, 158 N.E. 77, 78
(1927)); (b) a "three-element" approach (which really has more than three elements,
and lists as one of the "elemepts" the very issue to be determined), consisting of (i)
mutual consent of the parties to form a partnership and to participate in the profits
which may accrue from property, skill, or industry, furnished to the business in determined
proportions by them, (ii) a sharing in the losses as well as the profits of the venture,
and (iii) the formation of a community of goods in which each party has a proprietary
interest, Darden v. Cox, 240 La. 310, 319, 123 So. 2d 68, 71 (1960); Glover v. Sowada,
457 So. 2d 101, 103 (La. App. 5th Cir.), cert. denied, 461 So. 2d 316 (La. 1984); and
(c) an "abbreviated three-element" test (which shortens the first element, but which still
has more than three elements and still states the issue as an element), consisting of (i)
mutual consent to form a partnership, (ii) sharing in the losses as well as the profits of
the venture, and (iii) formation of a community of goods in which each party has a
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and provided the groundwork for some improvement, but also some
further confusion, in this area of the law. The purpose of this discussion
is to place Cajun in perspective and to suggest a means for predicting
results in inadvertent partnership cases that is independent of the tests
and elements that the courts recite.
Partnership under the Civil Code is both a particular type of contract
and the juridical person created by that contract.4 Accordingly, the
Code's approach to the inadvertent partnership problem is first to "de-
fine" a partnership contract by listing its typical, distinguishing char-
acteristics (such as profit-sharing, collaboration, and mutual contributions
of value)5 and then to provide the various rules that are to govern both
the contract and the juridical person once the contract has been classified
as one of "partnership." ' 6 Under this scheme, a contract either fits the
"partnership" category or it does not, and the rules of partnership
either apply in their entirety or not at all.
Although this approach seems at first to create a fairly simple and
workable analytical model, it soon leads to the untenable notion that
the question in every inadvertent partnership case is wholly abstract and
always the same, i.e., "Is this a 'partnership' type of contract?" In
practice, of course, the courts are rarely asked to determine anything
quite that broad or complicated. The question the courts face is never
whether one person is the partner of another for all conceivable purposes,
but only whether he should be treated as such for purposes of resolving
the particular dispute before the court. That particular dispute might
proprietary interest, Carr v. Masters, 469 So. 2d 1147, 1149 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1985);
Butler v. Atwood, 420 So. 2d 742, 745 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1982). There seems to be no
recognition in the cases that any question exists concerning what the test really is. This
is true even in Cajun, which announces a seven-element test while citing U.P.A. and
three-element cases. Cajun, 452 So. 2d at 215 (citing, e.g., Walker v. Simmons, 155 So.
2d 234, 236 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1963)(U.P.A.) and Marine Services, Inc. v. A-I Indus.,
-Inc., 355 So. 2d 625, 628 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1978)(abbreviated three-element). Cajun
seems to have ignored the tests in those cases, and to have made up a new one simply
by restating in lengthier form the definition of partnership contained in Louisiana Civil
Code article 2801.
4. See La. Civ. Code arts. 2801, 2802.
5. The Civil Code provides that the parties to a partnership contract "combine their
efforts or resources in determined proportions and ... collaborate at mutual risk for
their common profit or commercial benefit." La. Civ. Code art. 2801.
6. Generally, the contract is governed by the conventional obligations articles, but
special rules are provided in the Partnership title concerning both the contractual ar-
rangement between the parties and the powers and responsibilities of the partnership as
a juridical person. See, e.g., La. Civ. Code arts. 2803 (equal participation in profits and
losses unless otherwise agreed), 2817 (partnership primarily liable for its debts, partners
bound for virile share).
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involve principles of contract, 7 tort, 8 or agency 9 law, or require the court
to ascertain the intention of the legislature with respect to a wide variety
of public-law issues.' 0 However, it rarely would require the court to
consider every one of those areas, and rarely would the parties have
researched or briefed the court on the implications that a "partnership"
or "no partnership" decision in one field would have on the law in
many other, virtually unrelated fields."
Nevertheless, in order to trigger, or to keep from triggering, any
one of the Civil Code's partnership provisions, the courts seem to believe
that they must determine whether all or none of the partnership articles
should apply, and must do this based solely on abstract "definitional"
criteria that often have little or nothing to do with the underlying,
fundamental issues that the court really is facing. 2 In Butler v. Atwood, 3
for example, the fourth circuit resolved a dispute over the imposition
of vicarious tort liability using, supposedly, the same test used in Carr
v. Masters14 to determine whether one party had a right of action to
partition co-owned business assets without also suing for dissolution
under partnership law. Although one would suppose that the tort case
would be governed by tort principles and the procedure case by principles
of procedure, none of the reported cases have drawn this type of
7. See Darden v. Cox, 240 La. 310, 123 So. 2d 68 (1960) (whether parties had agreed to
an equity-sharing arrangement).
8. See Butler v. Atwood, 420 So. 2d 742 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1982) (whether "lessor"
of service station should be held vicariously liable for personal injuries arising from the
tortious conduct of the service station employees).
9. The agency question might arise in the context of vicarious liability for torts,
see Butler, 420 So. 2d at 742; or vicarious liability for contracts, .see La. Civ. Code arts.
2814 (partner as mandatary of partnership), 3021 (principal bound to execute authorized
engagements).
10. See Cajun, 452 So. 2d at 212 (whether Legislature should be deemed to have
intended sales and use tax exemption to apply in respect of exempt entity's share in co-
owned enterprises).
11. Rules that are designed to protect the reasonable expectations of parties to
consensual transactions would not likely be very effective in implementing the policies of
risk-spreading, risk avoidance, and fairness that might be pertinent to nonconsensual
personal injury actions.
12. Whether the two parties to a business relationship hive actually agreed to share
losses (which seems to be required by the three-element tests, see supra note 3) should
have little bearing on whether one or both of those parties should be held responsible
for the risks posed to third parties by the operation of that business, even though the
terms of their loss agreement might be absolutely controlling in an action by one against
the other for indemnification. Cf. La. Civ. Code art. 2815 ("no loss" stipulation does
not affect third parties). But cf. Butler, 420 So. 2d at 746 (even in actions by third
parties, intent of contracting parties to share losses is an "indispensable element" in
finding a partnership).
13. 420 So. 2d 742 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1982).
14. 469 So. 2d 1147 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1985).
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distinction explicitly. Instead, where the square peg seems not to fit the
round hole, the courts get out the knife and putty and start shaving
here and adding there. But they still claim to be using a square peg.
Thus, in one case the parties may be required to show an express
agreement to the partnership "elements"' 5 while in others, purportedly
addressing the very same issue, assent to the elements may be inferred
from the circumstances.' 6 Similarly, in some cases agreements to share
losses "as well as profits" must be shown, 7 while in others the loss-
sharing agreement is considered implied by the very fact that the profits
themselves, net of debt payments, are to be shared between the parties.' 8
These kinds of cases cannot be reconciled abstractly. Abstractly,
they say opposite things. But if the distractions of the abstract classi-
fication scheme can be avoided even for a moment, the more funda-
mental underlying issues are not that difficult to spot. In Darden v.
Cox, 19 for example, the leading supreme court decision on partnership
criteria, the plaintiff was seeking a thirty percent share in the equity of
a business. It was established that the parties had agreed that he was
to participate in thirty percent of the business' profits and that, over
the years, he had left in part of his profits and contributed additional
capital to the business.20 It seems clear that the fundamental issue in
Darden was whether the parties involved had assented to a contractual
arrangement under circumstances that had led the thirty percent partic-
ipant reasonably to conclude that he owned thirty percent of any increase
in the business' value. Nevertheless, the court's rationale suggests that
the plaintiff won because, having proven that a partnership existed, he
had triggered a suppletory provision in the Civil Code that gave him a
share in the equity of the business. 2' To trigger this provision, however,
he had to satisfy a partnership test that included as only one of its
elements a showing that the parties had assented to the creation of a
"community of property" in which each had a "proprietary interest. ' 22
The court in Darden did not seem to see the irony, that the plaintiff
had to prove the existence of an actual agreement not only on the very
15. Glover, 457 So. 2d at 107; cf. Butler, 420 So. 2d at 746 (actual agreement
required).
16. See, e.g., Darden, 240 La. at 321-22, 123 So. 2d at 73-74; Carr, 469 So. 2d at
1149; cf. Cajun, 452 So. 2d at 216 (partnership may exist despite clearly expressed
intention not to create such an entity); Fossier v. American Printing Co., 130 So. 2d
529, 533 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1961) (parties' stated intention is not controlling; court will
determine what they really intended).
17. Butler, 420 So. 2d at 746; Glover, 457 So. 2d at 103.
18. Carr, 469 So. 2d at 1149; Fossier, 130 So. 2d at 532-33.
19. 240 La. 310, 123 So. 2d 68 (1960).
20. Id. at 315, 322-26, 123 So. 2d at 70, 72-74.
21. Id. at 330, 123 So. 2d at 75.
22. Id. at 319, 329, 123 So. 2d at 71, 75.
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term that he wished to have imposed (based solely on constructive assent)
as a result of the suppletory rules of partnership law, but also on the
other "elements" of the partnership test, none of which should have
been considered important once the actual agreement on community
property was established. Fortunately for the plaintiff, the Darden court
at least was willing to infer an agreement on the "community of assets"
element, and did not insist that an express form of actual agreement
be proven.23
If the notion seems silly that a plaintiff might have to prove an express
agreement on the very point that he is trying to have covered by a suppletory
provision, then consider Glover v. Sowada.24 In Glover, the court denied the
plaintiff's Darden-like claim to a share in the business assets because she had
failed to prove an express agreement on each one of the partnership elements,
including the establishment of a community of goods in which each party had
a propriet Lry interest. 25
The question posed by the disagreement between Darden and Glover
is not really which court's view on inferences is correct, for the "tacit
assent" approach clearly makes more sense, 26 but why in contrast to
the Darden cdurt, the court in Glover wanted to choose a rule that was
so clearly going to defeat the plaintiff's claim. As usual, the answer
lies in the facts. Unlike the pure business relationship in Darden, the
arrangement in Glover seemed to the court to be motivated largely by
a personal relationship between the "partners," a woman and her live-
in companion. 27 The real question in Glover, therefore, was not whether,
in the abstract, the arrangement in question had as many partnership
elements as did the relationship in Darden, but whether the court would
allow an end run around the rules on the establishment of marital
communities by permitting partnership doctrines to establish analogous
rights in "business" communities. Surely, both the court and the lawyers
in that case realized that was the real issue. Nevertheless, the cases were
written as if one of the decisions, Darden, was taking a stand in favor
23. Id. at 323-29, 123 So. 2d at 73-75.
24. 457 So. 2d 101 (La. App. 5th Cir.), cert. denied, 461 So. 2d 316 (La. 1984).
25. 457 So. 2d at 104-05, 107.
26. The partnership agreement is to be governed by the provisions of the Louisiana
Civil Code concerning conventional obligations, article 2802, and those provide for contract
formation through offer and acceptance "made orally, in writing, or by action or inaction
that under the circumstances is clearly indicative of consent." La. Civ. Code art. 1927.
If express, or even actual agreement to each of the partnership elements really was
required for the formation of a partnership, the "elements" would have to be changed,
because they otherwise would require, among other things, an actual agreement to be
liable for losses and an actual intention to form a partnership. Assent to these elements
is more typically established constructively. Accord, Cajun 452 So. 2d at 216; Fossier,
130 So. 2d at 533.
27. 457 So. 2d at 102-04, 107.
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of inferences, while the other, Glover, was taking the opposite position.28
These two cases, which seem representative, suggest strongly that
the courts are willing manipulate the pertinent partnership tests to the
extent necessary to rationalize results that make sense in light of the
types of issues really involved.
If this view is correct, that narrower, more fundamental issues of
law lie hidden beneath the single abstract "partnership" question that
the courts always purport to be addressing, then it should be possible
in practice to evaluate the strength of one's case more accurately by
discounting the court's stated rationales than by following them closely.
It should also be possible to improve one's legal arguments by stressing
the factors that are pertinent to the fundamental issues, while suggesting
the limited relevance of any remaining, abstract definitional criteria.
That would not mean that the issues "really" involved would always
be easy to resolve. It would have been difficult, for example, to decide
the issue of marriage-like communities of assets in Glover even if the
true issue had been stated explicitly. The fact that it was not so stated,
however, should not lead anyone to believe that Glover posed any less
difficult an issue.
How, then, does Cajun fit the old pattern of cases? It fits well,
for even though it announces a new, more detailed test, the test it
announces still purports to be universal. 29 Indeed, the court seems to
have been surprised that the plaintiff would have the temerity actually
to suggest that two participants in a common project might well be
treated as partners for federal income tax purposes, without also being
treated as partners for all other purposes.3"
The narrow issue in Cajun was whether the plaintiff's tax exempt
status as an electrical cooperative could be claimed with respect to its
thirty percent ownership interest in a power plant that was co-owned
seventy percent by Gulf States Utilities Company (GSU), a nonexempt
private company." Despite this, the court did not discuss whether sound
tax policies would permit this kind of "partial" exemption, considering,
for example, the potential it might create for unintended exemption-
sharing or transfer arrangements. Instead, the court announced its new,
universal seven-element partnership test and, after a fairly cursory dis-
cussion of how the Cajun-GSU arrangement satisfied it, ruled that a
28. The court did acknowledge both the similarity between the marriage relationship
and the relationship in Glover, and the interrelationship of personal and business factors
in such relationships. However, the court seemed not to want to explore the question of
why, under those circumstances, it might not be appropriate to give some form of
community property interests to the plaintiff. See 457 So. 2d at 107.
29. 452 So. 2d at 215-16.
30. Id. at 216.
31.7 The taxes had already been paid, and Cajun was suing for a refund. Id. at 214.
[Vol. 46
BUSINESS A SSOCIA TIONS
partnership had indeed been created.32 The court then ruled that the
partnership, as a separate juridical person, would have to have its own
exemption in order to avoid payment of the taxes involved. Because it
did not possess any such exemption, the court ruled that the contested
taxes had been collected lawfully. 33 As in most inadvertent partnership
cases, the result in Cajun seems more defensible than the analysis sup-
porting it.
From the standpoint of the abstract criteria themselves, Cajun did
improve on the older tests by changing the "agree to share losses"
element to a "mutual risk" requirement. 34 That apparently was based
on a 1980 change to the Civil Code that reversed the earlier rule against
enforcing "no loss" agreements even between the parties. 3  Unfortu-
nately, however, Cajun also kept or invented some other "requisite
elements" that could well be missing from an arrangement that might
otherwise, abstractly, be considered a partnership. The court in Cajun
stated, for example, that the parties to a partnership had to provide
"joint effort" and that any contributions by the parties of efforts or
resources had to be in "determinate proportions. 3 6 This suggests, un-
wisely, that a general partnership could not exist with passive, silent
partners, and that sloppiness -or informality concerning the amount or
percentage of each party's contribution to the business could keep the
business from being considered a partnership at all.
The impact of Cajun is difficult to assess. It is possible that these
additional elements will make it more difficult to prove the establishment
of a partnership, particularly if express assent to each of the items is
32. More precisely, the court said that a joint venture was created, but that partnership
law governed joint ventures, including questions whether the ventures have been created.
Id. at 215-16.
33. The court did support its view that the formal structure of the transaction should
govern the applicability of the exemption by noting that tax exemptions were to be
construed strictly against the person claiming them. Id. at 217.
34. Compare Cajun, 452 So. 2d at 215, with, e.g., Butler, 420 So. 2d at 746; Walker
v. Delahoussaye, 116 So. 2d 884, 887 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1959) (no partnership because,
among other things, agreement between the parties provided that one was to bear no
losses).
35. Compare La. Civ. Code art. 2815 (Supp. 1985) ("no loss" stipulations unen-
forceable only with respect to third parties) with La. Civ. Code art. 2814 (1952) (prior
law, "no loss" stipulations between partners void both as to third parties and as between
the parties). Under prior law, a court had to find that no partnership existed in order
to give effect to an otherwise enforceable "no loss" agreement. See Walker, 116 So. 2d
at 887. This helps explain Louisiana's emphasis on the "agree to share loss" element of
the partnership tests.
36. 452 So. 2d at 215. The court also said that one of the requisites to the formation
of a partnership was that "a juridical entity or person is established." That, of course,
puts the cart before the horse, for it is the contract that creates the juridical person, not
the other way around.
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required. 7 However, if the courts use this test as they have the others,
it is very likely that the elements of the Cajun test will be utilized
selectively, and with differing meanings attached, depending on the
court's need to rationalize a result it has already reached on a more
fundamental, underlying issue.
ANTITAKEOVER PROVISIONS
The 1984 Louisiana Legislature enacted a fairly complicated set of
provisions, Louisiana Revised Statutes (La. R.S.) sections 12:132-134, that
are supposed to protect the interests of dissenting shareholders in connection
with business combinations that involve publicly-held, Louisiana-incorpo-
rated companies." The purpose of this brief discussion is to untangle these
convoluted provisions and to suggest that the Act will more likely help in-
cumbent management than protect the victimized shareholder. Questions
concerning the constitutionality of this type of legislation will also be men-
tioned.
The legislation has three sections. The first, section 132, lists def-
initions; the second, section 133, imposes a supermajority vote require-
ment with respect to business combinations involving Louisiana companies;
and the third, section 134, lists exemptions from this voting requirement.
The key to understanding the new legislation is to see how the interplay
of the statute's voting requirement and exemptions is likely to affect
the behavior of bidders for control of Louisiana-incorporated businesses.
The acquiror who is content to obtain working control of a company
and to operate it indefinitely as a subsidiary, without ever effecting a
merger or other combination, is likely not to be affected at all. The
statute seems designed not to regulate the simple acquisition of a con-
trolling percentage of voting stock but instead the "mop up" or "freeze-
out" transaction that often follows such an acquisition.3 9 For takeover
37. See supra text accompanying note 15.
38. La. R.S. 12:132-134 (Supp. 1985). The Legislature entitled the new provisions
"Dissenting Shareholders' Rights and Fair Price Protection." The requirements do not
apply to companies with fewer than 100 beneficial shareholders. La. R.S. 12:134 E(l)(a)
(Supp. 1985).
39. Because of the very broad definition of the "business combinations" to which
the new provisions purport to be applicable, it is conceivable that the statute could be
construed to apply even to the consummation of tender offers for stock that take place
in the secondary markets. The definition of "business combination," the event for which
a vote or exemption is required, includes
the issuance or transfer by the corporation or any subsidiary, in one transaction or a
series of transactions, of any equity securities of the corporation or any subsidiary
which has an aggregate market value of five percent or more of the total market value
of the outstanding stock of the corporation . . ..
La. R.S. 12:132(4)(c) (Supp. 1985). If this reference to a "transfer" of stock by the
corporation was interpreted to include the record transfers of stock needed to cause the
[Vol. 46
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efforts that depend on the availability of these follow-up devices, how-
ever, the new statute could well prove devastating.
In the typical two-stage acquisition, the bidder obtains control of
the target company in the first stage of his takeover by announcing a
tender offer that provides generous premiums to shareholders who are
willing to sell him their stock. Because of the premiums involved, most
noncontrolling shareholders are perfectly happy, even eager, to sell their
shares in this first stage offer.4 0 As announced in his offer, however,
the bidder will normally be willing to accept and pay only for that part
of the tendered stock necessary for him to secure control.4 The remaining
stock will be acquired in the second stage of the takeover. In that stage,
the bidder will merge the target into another company that he already
controls.42 Because the bidder controls both parties to this merger, he
is able to adopt a plan of merger that forces the target's minority
shareholders to sell him their stock at any price he chooses,43 subject
corporate books to reflect the changes of beneficial ownership that occurred in the
secondary markets, then the purchaser of a substantial block of stock (five percent by a
ten percent or greater shareholder) would either have to subject himself to the statute or
rely solely on proxies and assignments of rights, rather than on record transfers, to obtain
the rights and benefits associated with the shares he had purchased. This construction is
highly unlikely in view of the statute's emphasis on beneficial ownership, see La. R.S.
12:132(3), (6), (9), and would very likely be considered unconstitutional. See infra text
accompanying notes 66-71. Some commentators seem simply to have assumed that this
type of enactment would not regulate tender offers. See Kramer, Tender Offer Devel-
opments, in I Hostile Battles for Corporate Control 59, 68 (1985) (discussing Maryland
provision on which the Louisiana enactment is based, see infra note 73); Warren, De-
velopments in State Takeover Regulation: MITE and Its Aftermath, 40 Bus. Law. 671,
696-98 (1984) (discussing Maryland law).
40. Indeed, the federal rules on tender offers are designed to prevent shareholder
stampedes in these offers by requiring a minimum offering period and the pro rata
acceptance of shares tendered, regardless of the time during the offering period at which
they were tendered. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(6) (1982); 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-8 (1985).
41. This is lawful, as long as the offeror pro-rates the acceptance of the stock that
is tendered. Id.
42. If this second, acquiring corporation is itself a substantial, publicly-traded com-
pany, the controlling person of the company will often avoid the trouble and expense of
a merger vote among that company's shareholders by forming a new, thinly-capitalized,
wholly-owned subsidiary to carry out the merger. This new company has only one share-
holder, the corporate parent, whose shares are voted by the parent company managers,
people whose jobs depend on their obedience to the parent company's controlling person.
This merger-through-a-subsidiary approach is called a "triangular" merger if the new
subsidiary is the survivor and a "reverse triangular" merger if the target survives. Control
is not affected, of course, by the nominal survival of the target. The target becomes a
wholly-owned subsidiary, and will have been made to survive simply to keep its licenses,
contracts, or regulatory approvals in place, undisturbed by the combination. See R.
Hamilton, Corporation Finance 507-09 (1984).
43. Louisiana law, like the Model Business Corporation Act (M.B.C.A.), imposes
only procedural requirements with respect to merger agreements; the substantive terms
19861
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only to the loose strictures of fiduciary duty and, sometimes, to the
dissenters' rights that may be afforded by statute.
44
While there is considerable disagreement over the fairness and effects
of the two-stage takeover in actual practice, ' 5 the bidder's control of
the second-stage price may, theoretically, make it possible for him to
pay for the premiums he offered in the first stage simply by stealing
the necessary money, plus a profit, in the second stage. 46 If this is true,
are left to negotiation. See La. R.S. 12:112(A) (1969) (the agreement is to prescribe the
terms of the merger and to contain any other provisions deemed necessary); La. R.S.
12:112(C) (1969) (agreements to be approved by vote of shareholders); compare M.B.C.A.
§ 71 (1982). Because a person that controls both parties is negotiating only with himself,
he has the power to establish the terms of the merger, including a requirement that
minority shareholders relinquish their stock in exchange for cash or property, rather than
stock in the surviving company. This "cashing out" of investors is expressly allowed in
the M.B.C.A., § 71 (c), and is implicitly permitted in Louisiana both by the absence of
substantive restraints and by language in the "short form" merger and dissenter rights
provisions that seem to sanction it. See La. R.S. 12:112(A) (1969) (mergers in accordance
with agreement), La. R.S. 12:112(H) (1969) (short form merger in which ninety percent
parent adopts plan to exchange cash or other consideration for the remaining shares of
the subsidiary held by others), La. R.S. 12:131(C) (1969) (shareholder entitled only to
cash value of his share in the event he dissents).
44. La. R.S. 12:131 (1969). Compare, M.B.C.A. §§ 80, 81 (1982). Curiously, Louisiana
protects dissenters' rights in a short-form merger, where a parent has ninety percent
control, but not where the proponents of a merger control, or are able to obtain approval
from, only eighty percent or more of a company's shares. Compare La. R.S. 12:112(H)
(1969) with La. R.S. 12:131(A) (1969). The ninety percent parent who wishes to avoid dissenters'
rights would be wise, therefore, to avoid the short form approach, and to go ahead with the
charade of holding a full-fledged vote.
45. Although no conclusive data exists, some empirical studies suggest that target
shareholders realize j remiums whether or not they go along with the first-stage tender,
for the target's market price often remains elevated even after completion of the offer.
See Lowenstein, Pruning Deadwood in Hostile Takeovers: A Proposal for Legislation, 83
Colum. L. Rev. 249, 289-90 (1983); Easterbrook & Fischel, Takeover Bids, Defensive
Tactics, and Shareholders' Welfare, 36 Bus. Law. 1733, 1739-40 (1981). This suggests that
the market, on the average, does not anticipate that the bidder will be capable of squeezing
out the minority at prices below those prevailing prior to the commencement of his
takeover efforts. The squeeze out is therefore not considered unfair. Others believe that
the squeeze out permits the bidder to exploit short-term market conditions to seize the
long-term, "intrinsic" value of the targeted business from minority investors powerless
to stop the takeover. These commentators suggest that it is principally the fear of the
second-stage freeze out that motivates many shareholders to respond so favorably to the
first-stage offer. See Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom, 35 Bus. Law.
101, 114-15 (1979). There is no question that the involuntary, second-stage price is often
much lower than that offered in the first stage to shareholders under no compulsion to
sell. See M. Lipton & E. Steinberger, Takeovers and Freezeouts § 1.0714][c] (1984) (describing
two-stage acquisitions in which the prices were, e.g., $125 cash, first stage, $76 in notes
second stage, $41 cash, first stage, $29 in preferred stock, second stage).
46. The two-step takeover can also be used to force the target to pay off the debt
that the bidder's company incurred to take it over. Under this strategy, a bidder forms
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even the savvy shareholder, one who knows perfectly well what is going
on, cannot protect himself. He can either help the bidder in the first
stage by selling him as much stock as he can, knowing that any premiums
paid, plus a profit, will be stolen back, or he can refuse to cooperate,
let someone else take the premiums and simply wait for the inevitable
merger. He will get nothing for his recalcitrance but the loss of his
share of the first-stage premiums.4 7
The new takeover provisions purport to attack this abusive type of
acquisition financing by prohibiting any nonexempted merger (or other
business combination) unless the proposed combination is approved not
only by the target's board of directors, but also by eighty percent of
the shares eligible to vote and by two-thirds of the voting shares not
held by any "interested" shareholder, i.e., any owner of ten percent or
more of the company's stock. 48 That last, "two-thirds disinterested"
requirement is the critical one. It essentially causes the bidder to lose
his vote with respect to nonexempted transactions as soon as he passes
the ten percent level of ownership. This means he can never acquire a
controlling vote for merger purposes and so can never hope to con-
summate the squeeze-out that he is depending on to make his takeover
profitable.4 1 It also means that shares in excess of ten percent are
a new, thinly-capitalized acquisition company and causes it to borrow the money it needs
to purchase a controlling interest in the target. Someone substantial, perhaps one of the
bidder's existing, creditworthy companies, usually has to guarantee this obligation, but
that works out once the takeover is completed, for the second-stage merger causes the
acquisition debt to become payable out of the earnings produced by the assets of the
target. The survivor of a second-stage combination under these circumstances looks pretty
much like the target in its pre-takeover days, except that it now has more debt and is
now controlled by someone else.
47. He could also sell all his shares in the open market, of course, but if the market
was as smart as he was, its prices would already be discounted in anticipation of both
the limits on first-stage premiums and the likelihood of second-stage losses. A sell-out
under those circumstances would simply hasten the day of reckoning. But see supra note
45.
48. La. R.S. 12:133 (Supp. 1985). These supermajority requirements override any
provisions in the articles which may purport to reduce the vote normally required for
these combinations unless one of the exemptions to the supermajority requirement is
satisfied. La. R.S. 12:134(F) (Supp. 1985).
49. The bidder could engage in a proxy fight to obtain the two-thirds vote, but if
he expects to do that, even after purchasing a majority of the company's stock, he might
just as well save his stock purchase money and invest it in a proxy fight to begin with.
The proxy fight, though, will generally seem less attractive to a bidder than a tender
offer, for a proxy fight requires the acquiror to invest his money in little more than a
public relations campaign. It is easy to see why a prospective acquiror, despite the higher
cost of the tender offer, prefers the relative certainty of buying votes (attached to shares,
of course) to the unpredictability of a campaign to talk shareholders into giving them
away (on a revocable basis) free of charge. But see Bialkin, Attura & Gottlieb, Proxy
Contests for Corporate Control, in I Hostile Battles for Corporate Control 9, 13-16 (1985)
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worthless to him for merger purposes, so that he is very unlikely to
pay very much for them if he wants them principally for that reason.
Despite the depressing effect these provisions might have on first-
stage premiums, however, the new statute might very well make sense
as a means of preventing abusive two-stage takeovers if it did not contain
exemptions so clearly inconsistent with those aims. Of the three ex-
emptions pertinent to this discussion, 0 only one is reconcilable with a
shareholder-protection policy. The other two seem designed simply to
strengthen management's hand in negotiating with hostile bidders.
To satisfy the one shareholder-oriented exemption, the bidder must,
among other things,5' provide payment for the stock to be acquired or
extinguished in the squeeze-out not only in the same form as paid in
any earlier transactions in which he acquired the majority of his stock,52
but also in an amount equal to the highest price produced by a so-
phisticated series of standards which are designed to capture premiums
for the minority stockholders at least as large as those paid in earlier,
voluntary transactions." Thus, if no other exemptions were available,
(proxy fight may be reemerging as takeover device less expensive and less susceptible to
defensive maneuvering than tender offers).
50. Other exemptions make the voting requirement inapplicable where (i) the cor-
poration has fewer than one hundred beneficial owners of its stock, or (ii) the corporation
is an investment company registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940, i.e., a
mutual fund. La. R.S. 12:134(E)(1)(a), (c) (Supp. 1985). Also, a new company may "opt
out" of the provision by including in its articles of incorporation a provision to that
effect. Once incorporated, however, the company cannot opt out except by the same
eighty percent/two-thirds vote required for the covered business combinations themselves.
La. R.S. 12:134(E)(1)(b) (Supp. 1985).
51. The bidder is also required to avoid self-dealing with the target, La. R.S. 12:134(B)(5)
(Supp. 1985) to send written objections to the company concerning any dividend reductions,
La. R.S. 12:134(B)(4)(a)(ii), 12:134(B)(4)(b) (Supp. 1985), and to refrain from acquiring
any further stock on any transaction occurring after the one in which he became a ten
percent or greater owner. La. R.S. 12:134(B)(4)(a)(iii) (Supp. 1985) ("interested share-
holders" may not become the beneficial owner of any additional stock after the transaction
in which he became an "interested shareholder"); La. R.S. 12:132(9) (Supp. 1985) ("in-
terested shareholder" is a beneficial owner of ten percent or more of the voting power
of the corporation or an affiliate of the corporation that in the preceding two years had
been beneficial owner of ten percent of the voting stock then outstanding). The "standstill"
part of the exemption essentially allows a gradual increase of ownership to just below
ten percent, but then all6ws only one more "bite." If the acquiror wishes to obtain
control, therefore, he will generally have to announce a public tender offer in order to
get as much of the remaining stock as he needs for control in one final transaction. This
restriction does not apply, of course, to nominal acquisitions of "additional" shares as
the result of proportionate stock dividends or stock splits. La. R.S. 12:134(B)(4)(a)(iii)
(Supp. 1985).
52. La. R.S. 12:134(B)(3) (Supp. 1985).
53. La. R.S. 12:134(B)(1) (Supp. 1985) (price standards for common stock); La. R.S.
12:134(B)(2) (Supp. 1985) (price standards for stock other than common stock). Both
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the bidder would be forced by the new statute either to pay at least
subsections, (1) and (2), establish three minimum prices. The price paid must be at least
as great as the highest of these three minimums. The three minimums are: (i) the highest
price (including transaction costs such as brokerage fees) paid by the ten percent holder
at any time within the two years preceding the date that he publicly announced, or
communicated generally to shareholders, his intention to effect the business combination
(or, without regard to the two-year period, the price paid in the transaction in which he
became a ten percent holder, if that price was higher), (ii) the "market value" of the
shares to be acquired as of the "announcement date" mentioned in (i), above, or on the
date on which acquiror passed the ten percent level of ownership; and (iii) the "market
value" as determined in (ii), above, times a market appreciation factor equal to the ratio
of the two-year high described in (i) over the acquiror's "beginning price," the price at
which he first bought stock within that two year period.
In simpler terms, the minority shareholders must be offered the highest of (i) the
stock's two-year high, (ii) the stock's market value, as it may be affected (usually upward)
by the bidder's taking a ten percent stake or announcing his plans to effect a combination,
or (iii) the market value in (ii), plus a premium based on a two-year market appreciation
ratio.
The treatment of stock other than common (preferred or preference stock) differs
from the common stock requirements only in its addition of a fourth minimum, the
highest preferential amount to which the holders of those shares would be entitled in the
event of a liquidation, dissolution, or winding up of the company. La. R.S. 12:134(B)(2)(b)
(Supp. 1985).
As complicated as this may seem, it is far simpler, and more valuable to minority
shareholders, than the approach traditionally taken in dissenters' rights statutes. The
traditional statutes generally require the dissenting shareholders first to survive a series
of substantive exemptions and procedural traps, see La. R.S. 12:131(B)-(E) (Supp. 1985)
and then give them the right only to litigate the "true" value of their stock as of one
point in time, just before the approval of the combination from which they are dissenting.
See La. R.S. 12:131(C) (Supp. 1985). By then, of course, the market will already have
discounted its prices for the stock in anticipation of the squeeze-out. But see supra note
45. Accordingly, the judge in the appraisal proceeding, who by the way is probably not
as sophisticated financially as the acquiror or other price-affecting participants in the
market place, will have to come up with a price that strikes him as fair, and then will
have to rationalize his conclusion with a series of highly speculative calculations designed
to demonstrate the "true" value of the stock. Accord, Peimonte v. New Boston Garden
Corp., 377 Mass. 719, 387 N.E.2d 1145 (1979) (Delaware block- approach, combining
asset value, earnings value, and market value, in the proportions the judge determined
to be appropriate under the circumstances, including in this case the popularity of certain
hockey players on the team that played in this stadium owned by the company, and the
chance that a new hockey league might be successful enough to affect the company's
earnings).
The new provisions do away with this "litigated value" approach. The dissenter need
not convince a judge in litigation that he actually was cheated. Indeed, he need not file
a lawsuit at all; his rights under the new provisions will be triggered automatically by
the bidder's own activities. It is the acquiror, not the dissenter, who must be careful
under the new provisions, for if he slips, he will have to persuade two-thirds of the
noncontrolling shareholders that the deal he is proposing really is to their advantage.
Another advantage for the minority shareholders is that the new legislation is much
more sophisticated in its listing of the types of business combinations to which the voting/
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the same premium to involuntary sellers as he had to the voluntary
ones54 or to face the prospect of trying to persuade the owners of two-
thirds of the remaining, noncontrolled shares that the combination he
is proposing is really in their best interests. It would be virtually im-
possible under these circumstances to steal money from the minority
investors.5
Facing this Hobson's choice, though, the rational acquiror is likely
to look for another exemption. Fortunately for him, he still has the
other two left.
Under the first, a company that had stockholders owning ten percent
or greater blocks of its stock as of January 1, 1985, is exempt from
the voting requirements unless the board of directors of that company
"opts in" to the new provisions by resolution.5 6 The board may choose
in its resolution to opt in generally or with respect only to one or more
specified ten percent holders or types of ten percent holders. 7 Once the
board opts in, though, the company may opt out only by the eighty
percent/two-thirds vote required for business combinations. Under
the second exemption, for companies that had no ten percent (or greater)
pricing provisions are applicable. Compare La. R.S. 12:132(4) (Supp. 1985) ("combina-
tions" under the new statute include mergers, triangular mergers, share exchanges, noncash
liquidations, stock issues, or recapitalizations that increase holder's stake by five percent
or more, and asset sales out of the ordinary course of ten percent or more of total value)
with La. R.S. 12:131(A) (1969) (traditional dissenters' rights apply only to mergers,
consolidations, and sales of substantially all assets, to which the corporation is a party).
This makes it much less likely that an acquiror can avoid the dissenters' rights simply
by rearranging the formal structure of the transaction. The new provision also leaves out
the "800o approval" and "exchange-listed stock" exemptions provided under the traditional
dissenters' rights provisions. Compare La. R.S. 12:134 (new provision's exemptions) with
La. R.S. 12:13 1(A) (1969) (traditional dissenters' rights unavailable if combination approved
by eighty percent or more of the total voting power), La. R.S. 12:131(B)(3) (Supp. 1985)
(rights unavailable, except in squeeze outs, if company's stock is listed on a national
securities exchange).
54. Indeed, there is a good chance under item (ii) or (iii) of the pricing standard,
see supra note 53, that the bidder would be forced (if he wished to avoid the eighty
percent/two-thirds vote) to offer a premium whose size was determined in large part by the mar-
ket activities of others.
55. Because of the pricing "overkill," see supra note 54, the new provisions are also
likely to increase the uncertainties over second-stage prices so much that they will discourage
takeovers that are expected to be only marginally profitable. Even without uncertainty,
the new provisions are likely to depress first-stage premiums by forcing the bidder to
spread out his premiums among all shareholders, rather than loading most of them on
the front end of the takeover.
56. La. R.S. 12:134(D)(1) (Supp. 1985). Although it is only the board, and not the
shareholders, that adopts this resolution, it is nevertheless treated as an amendment to
the articles of the company, La. R.S. 12134(D)(4) (Supp. 1985), and can be rescinded
only by supermajority vote. La. R.S. 12:134(D)(3) (Supp. 1985).
57. La. R.S. 12:134(D)(1) (Supp. 1985).
58. La. R.S. 12:134(D)(3) (Supp. 1985).
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shareholders on January 1, 1985, the board has to "opt out" of the
voting requirements by means of a resolution adopted before the date
that the particular bidder involved reached or passed the ten percent
level of ownership. 9 The resolution may specify the particular bidder
or types of bidder covered,6" and unless the resolution is made irrevocable
by its terms, it may be altered or repealed at the pleasure of the board.'
Although the company involved must opt in under one provision
and opt out under the other, 62 the thing that both of these exemptions
have in common is that they permit the target company's existing board,
its incumbent management, to control whether and against whom the
supermajority vote requirement is to be imposed. This means that ac-
quirors will have more reason than ever to purchase management's
cooperation by means of control premiums, long-term employment con-
tracts, golden parachutes, and the like, and that management will have
more power than ever to demand that these kinds of arrangements be
offered. By eliminating the bidder's incentive to buy votes from share-
holders, and instead giving him a good reason to pay managers63 for
theirs, the statute effectively takes the economic value of the voting
rights normally attached to the shareholder's stock (and normally pur-
chased in tender offers)6 and gives it to the company's managers. 5
59. La. R.S. 12:134(C)(l)(b) (Supp. 1985).
60. La. R.S. 12:134(C)(1) (Supp. 1985).
61. Id.
62. The very difference in the statute's treatment of controlled and noncontrolled
companies helps preserve existing control structures. Existing ten percent holders, if they
control a company, can exempt themselves, but deny similar exemptions to others, while
the "professional managers" of a company without ten percent holders know that any
bidder has to talk to them before crossing the ten percent level of ownership (if he ever
expects to effect a business combination involving "their" company). Although fear of
a "taking property" argument may have played some role in the decision to exempt
existing ten percent holders, that fear would not explain why the existing control persons
are given the power to "fine tune" the application of the statute with respect to other
prospective bidders.
The organizers of companies incorporated after January 1, 1985, control whether the
supermajority vote requirements of § 133 are to apply to those companies. See note 50,
supra. The statute does not explicitly condone the "fine-tuning" of these "new company"
decisions.
63. The term "manager" as used in the discussion is meant to refer to the person
or body of persons that actually has the ability, as distinguished from the formal legal
power, to select the majority of a company's board of directors. For a company dominated
by a single person or family, the controlling shareholders would for purposes of the
discussion, be considered the company's managers. For companies without any major
shareholders, the executives of the company would be its managers. See W. Klein, Business
Organization and Finance 126-29 (1980).
64. On the normal role of the noncontrolling vote in corporate takeovers, see W.
Klein, supra note 63, at 131; M. Eisenberg, The Structure of a Corporation 66-68 (1976).
65. The bidder will not likely be interested in buying a vote that disappears for
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Although the managers and bidders will undoubtedly prove capable of
dividing up this transferred value on a mutually satisfactory basis, it is
difficult to see how this diversion of the bidder's money from share-
holders to managers is in the noncontrolling shareholders' best interests.
As suggested at the beginning of this discussion, the constitutionality
of this type of provision is uncertain. The United States Supreme Court
has already held older-style, pro-management antitakeover acts uncon-
stitutional on grounds that they impose an undue burden on interstate
commerce. 66 Three Justices, and several lower courts, have also been
willing to strike down these types of statutes on grounds of preemption
by federal legislation concerning tender offers. 67 Louisiana's version of
the older-style statute was held unconstitutional in 19796 but was amended
later that year 69 and still remains on the books.7 1 It is very unlikely that
it could now withstand a challenge, for the Louisiana legislation is very
much like the antitakeover statute that the Supreme Court expressly
declared unconstitutional . 7'
merger purposes as soon as he acquires it. Only the directors have the power under the
new provisions to cut a deal with the bidder that works. Accordingly, it is only the
directors that will have the power to demand compensation for their cooperation. The
compensation will have to be structured with some subtlety, of course, as the directors
will have their fiduciary duties to consider. But cf. Jarrell, The Wealth Effects of Litigation
by Targets: Do Interests Diverge in a Merge? 28 J.L. & Econ. 151 (1985). Mr. Jarrell
concludes from an empirical study that management resistance to takeovers usually results
in higher premiums for shareholders, as a result of the competitive bidding and "white
knight" efforts that typically are stimulated. The Louisiana provision, however, probably
would work against this result, for it takes away the shareholder's ability to sell the
bidder his vote at any price. Bidding wars in a two-stage takeover would become useless
because none of the shares purchased could be counted in approving the second-stage
business combination.
66. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 102 S. Ct. 2629 (1982).
67. Justices White, Burger, and Blackmun joined in the portion of the opinion in
MITE that found the Illinois law involved to be preempted. 457 U.S. at 626. For lower
court preemption decisions, see, e.g., National City Lines, Inc. v. LLC Corp., 687 F.2d
1122 (8th Cir. 1982)(decided after MITE); MITE Corp. v. Dixon, 633 F.2d 486 (7th Cir.
1980), aff'd sub nom., Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 102 S. Ct. 2629 (1982);
Great Western United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1978), rev'd on other
grounds sub nom., Leroy v. Great Western United Corp., 443 U.S. 173, 99 S. Ct. 2710
(1979).
68. Brascan Ltd. v. Lassiter. Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 98,247 (E.D. La. 1979)
(Louisiana antitakeover law, La. R.S. 51:1500-1512, prior to 1979 amendments, violative
of both commerce and supremacy clauses).
69. 1979 La. Acts No. 401.
70. La. R.S. 51:1500-1512 (Supp. 1985).
71. Compare La. R.S. 51:1501(A), 1500.1(12), (13) (Supp. 1985) with Ill. Rev. Stat.
ch. 121 1/2, §137.52-10(2) (1979) as cited in MITE, 457 U.S. at 642, 102 S. Ct. at 2640
(repealed following MITE, Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 121 1/2 §§ 137.51-.70 (Supp. 1985); and
La. R.S. 51:1501(A), (B), & (E) (Supp. 1985) with Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 121 1/2 § 137.54(A)(B)(E)
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States have responded to the loss of their antitakeover statutes in
several ways.72 In enacting La. R.S. 12:132-134, Louisiana was copying
the Maryland approach.73 This approach was apparently thought to
conflict less directly with the federal scheme for regulating tender offers
than did the older-style statutes,7 4 and also to fit a perceived loophole
in the Supreme Court decision on the older-style statutes, an explicit
recognition that rules concerning internal corporate governance, unlike
the regulation of securities trading in the secondary markets, are matters
traditionally governed by the laws of the incorporating state. 75
Without question, the newer type of statute is not as clearly un-
constitutional as its ill-fated predecessors. Even this new statute, however,
is likely to impose substantial burdens on interstate securities trading,
based solely on formal connections to the enacting state, and will tend
to favor corporate management contrary to the policy of neutrality
underlying federal regulation of this field. There is a good possibility,
therefore, that these new statutes will also be declared unconstitutional.
The questions posed by these second generation enactments are much
closer, though, and the courts are much more likely to be divided on
these' issues than they were on the subject of the constitutionality of
the older, more straightforward antitakeover schemes. It would be ironic,
though, if the very success of earlier efforts to strike down the pro-
(1979) as cited in MITE, 457 U.S. at 635, 102 S. Ct. at 2637 (since repealed); and La.
R.S. 51:1501(E) (Supp. 1985) with I11. Rev. Stat. ch. 121 1/2, §137.54(E) (1979), as cited
in MITE, 457 U.S., at 639, 102 S. Ct. 2639 (since repealed).
72. One commentator has identified three different types of enactments, in Ohio,
Maryland, and Wisconsin. Warren, supra note 39, at 694-700 n.39. According to Warren,
Ohio's legislation regulates tender offers, but in a fashion closer to that utilized under
federal law. Maryland does not regulate the tender offer itself (but see supra note 39)
but instead imposes supermajority or fairness requirements on the second-stage business
combination. Wisconsin uses a combination of tender offer and business combination
regulations. Id.
73. Compare La. R.S. 12:132-134 (Supp. 1985) with Md. Corps. & Ass'ns Code Ann.
§§ 3-601 to 603 (1985).
74. The tender offer itself is not regulated, but only the second-stage transaction on
which the profitability of the takeover may depend. Thus, the new statute does not
interfere directly with the federal scheme for regulating tender offers, but only with the
policy of neutrality that underlies it.
75. See Warren, supra note 39, at 698 n.39. In MITE, in the one portion of the
opinion containing the holding with which a majority of the Justices concurred, Justice
White conceded that choice of law principles did recognize that "only one state should
have the authority to regulate a corporation's internal affairs-matters peculiar to the
relationships among or between the corporation and its current officers, directors, and
shareholders-because otherwise a corporation could be faced with conflicting demands."
457 U.S. at 645, 102 S. Ct. at 2642. Justice White did not suggest that this choice of
law principle was of constitutional import, or that this form of putative local interest
would justify the kinds of burdens on commerce that the new-style statutes impose.
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management, first generation statutes served as the impetus for giving
managers even greater controls over takeovers, and doing so in a con-
stitutionally-permissible fashion.
